"Fire fighting" solution to chaos in fire control

The chaos of the fire, the chaotic fire, and the failure to take care of oneself are the common problems in the fire fighting operations of the fire-fighting forces over the years. The reasons for the existence of problems (including systems and mechanisms) are manifold. This article only starts from the fire-fighting command, and from the perspective of being able to change, from the perspective of ideas and practice on the performance and causes of the problems, solutions to the problems, and matters needing attention. The preliminary analysis aims to arouse the contention and concern and to elevate the operational capability of the fire brigade.

This article can also provide reference for the unit management personnel: to understand the actual situation of the fire fighting force in the current fire fighting operations, to understand the difficulties and problems of the fire fighting command, and to conduct an in-depth study of how the unit operates in the initial fire extinguishing, with a view to improving.

I. The main manifestations and causes of chaos in fire command

(1) Overreaching command, lack of command, and multi-head command

1 . The issue of ultra vires command. Conducting command without commanding authority, for example, non-on-duty heads on the day, especially the leaders of the branch (large) in charge of fire extinguishing, chiefs of staff, headquarters, and other relevant personnel, directly intervened without the consent of the head of the watch. Commanding front-line troops; on-duty personnel of superior command centers, with knowledge of texts, pictures, videos and other information transmitted on site, learn about some situations and directly issue command orders; leaders of some local party committees, governments, and public security agencies directly go without directing authorization. The combat command was issued to the frontline combat personnel. The ultra vires command can easily lead to misjudgment of the disaster and lead to casualties or other consequences. At the same time, regular overstepping of command, especially the overriding command of the detachment headquarters command, will also make other on-duty personnel feel that they are in name only. Over time, the formation of "fire fighting is the command of the headquarters. Others on duty are just going through the field and do not need to participate." Misconception.

2 . Missing command. For various reasons (recognizing misunderstandings, capacity problems, and often being affected by overriding command influences, etc.), commanders who have commanding responsibilities in the brigade and detachment are unable to effectively issue command orders, and they are in force dispatch, external coordination, and operational priorities. In terms of division of labor, assignment of tasks, tactical organization, etc., the on-site commander was unable to speak and be passive. As a result, many front-line and multiple commanders were at a loss, busy and busy, and they had nothing to do. Some squadrons and brigade commanders positioned themselves incorrectly, forgot that they were a commander and treated themselves as a captain or combatant. They did not work for co-ordination and organization and command, but focused their eyes on water gunners. The squadron commander, the driver, the monitor, and even the squadron commander are all on the side, personally go up to grab water guns, move water guns, adjust parking spaces, too micro-force, so that lack of command, the lack of control of the overall situation.

3 . Long command problem. Since there was no unified headquarters, the general commander was absent, and the command center was not established. No one was assigned to the chief commander's side. The multiple commanders at the scene were all in-depth. You commanded me, and I directed me. Whoever commanded anything, whoever he was commanded; whoever was the commander of the squadron, sometimes directed directly to specific vehicles and officers, resulting in the departure of the vehicle and the crew from the sight and command of the commander of the original squadron; The sudden change in command and command, and some even conflict with each other, made the officers and men at a loss, and they did not know who they were listening to and could not form a fighting joint force.

(II) The command content is not comprehensive and the command procedure is not standardized

1 . The content of the command is not comprehensive. For various reasons, the commander involved the deployment of police force, situation information report, joint power dispatch, and combat information collection in the previous command process. Most of them focused only on the deployment of police force, while others issued fewer or no orders for command. During the first and mid-term, they paid more attention to the command of the first-line firefighting operations, and neglected the command of security management and control, public communication, information reporting, linkage and reinforcement, the division of tasks, operational priorities, water supply and other combat support, and fire investigation and handling. , leading to loss of balance in the front and rear; after the late attack and fire fighting, most of them focus on on-site technical tactics and deployment of forces, ignoring the release of information follow-up, staff rotation adjustment, political and ideological work, strong communication to the outside world and propaganda and other aspects arrangement. Due to the incompleteness of the content of the command, some confusion and inefficiency have appeared at all stages.

2 . The problem of non-standard command procedures. Due to the incomprehensive and unclear contents of the aforementioned command, the commander was very random in command and lacked the command flow at different stages (command content --- command command --- command object --- command feedback --- Commanding information sharing), thinking about which thing to direct, there is no priority level and order of command, and most of them can't be commanded by the headquarters, and the commander directly directs people. Especially in the early days, due to time constraints and numerous tasks, it was inevitable that omissions and misses would occur. When problems were discovered during the later stages of the recruitment process, they would lose their opportunities, reduce operational efficiency, and even cause irreversible losses.

(III) Outdated command mode and single command means

1 . The command mode is behind. When large-scale fires occur, the commanding tasks in the early stage are very heavy, and they are related to the operational objectives, the operational direction and the operational layout. The urgency and importance are self-evident. At present, the command pattern of many localities is relatively backward, relying solely on the presence of the command, and the application of information methods is not enough. The first level command of the detachment brigade in the first fifteen minutes or so after the reception of the police is missing. After the first battle unfold, detachment below the rank of first responders in attendance headquarters (about 3--4 people, including the duty officer, assistant fire, attendance Command commander, correspondent) generally to the scene, the scene commander visited the site in general, convened The squadron commander of the first-time squadron or the method of communication between the walkie-talkie and the telephone was informed about the situation, and the delay in issuing the combat command caused delays in the combat operations in the first battle. In particular, the best internal attack extinguishing time was basically lost during the construction fire. In the latter part of the war, quite a number of troops continued to use the low fire command mode for large-scale fire operations. The establishment of the command headquarters was slow, and there was a lack of functional grouping within the headquarters. The general commander was not able to obtain decision information, and the targeted overall command was difficult. In some cases, when the headquarters is temporarily established, the commanding staff is not responsible for collecting information, analyzing and analyzing policies, formulating plans, and assisting in command. Instead, it is overly concerned with front-line supervision, resulting in the emptying of the command center and the absence of general commanders (including operations, communications, and information). It is difficult to discuss and make decisions, and it is difficult to issue orders. Each functional group has its own warfare and voluntary order, resulting in information not being shared. It is uncoordinated before and after combat. It is unclear whether it is the order of the commander or the commander of the other officers. Whether it should be implemented or not should be implemented; there is inconsistency in caliber when externally distributing information, and there is no consultation with the public security department and the local government, and the external communication and command of the linkage power are not involved, and it is difficult to efficiently coordinate.

2 . Single command means. The current command of the fire brigade relies too much on telephones and walkie-talkies. These two methods rely on voice to convey command orders. The first problem is that there is no preservability and sharing; the second is a waste of time, especially on the phone, which is one-on-one transmission of information. It takes a lot of time to transmit to many people. For example, the initial command center and the commander of the squadron of the first squadron should deal with telephone inquiries from a large number of leaders at various levels and related personnel. It takes a lot of time to answer the call and seriously affects the command of the battle; the third is the dialect. Factors such as spoken language will affect the correctness of the transmission. Relying on this single command method, there may be a possibility of misunderstanding when commands and commands are issued. It is necessary to repeatedly communicate and re-communicate personnel who have not been heard or follow-up reinforcements and other functional groups other than combat. This wastes time and is difficult to implement quickly. Grasping the overall situation leads to low efficiency of operational command. In some places, video command is used, but relatively speaking, the collection of video is affected by the position and the quality of the collection personnel. It has a certain one-sidedness, and sometimes it may seem like a big fire, but the actual situation may not be dangerous. Loss of comprehensiveness.

Second, a few basic issues that must be clarified in order to solve the chaotic command of the fire field

(A) Solve the problem of who will direct

1 . First, it is necessary to solve the problems dictated by the government, the public security department (other departments), or the fire control agencies. According to the provisions of Article 45 of the “PRC Fire Protection Law”, “the fire department of the public security organ uniformly organizes and directs the fire at the scene”, that is to say, for fire fighting, it is the fire control agency that assumes the command function and is the statutory only.

2 . Secondly, the issue of which level of fire-fighting authority to direct is solved. According to Article 51 of the "Public Fire Fighting Forces on Combat Battle Order": "The public fire fighting and emergency rescue organization and command of the public security fire brigade is usually divided into five levels: the corps, detachment, brigade, squadron, and squad."; Article 54 It is stipulated that: “When public security fire fighting (large and medium) teams are fighting independently, they are usually commanded by their own commanders. When more than two public security fire fighting (large and medium) teams coordinate their operations, the superior commander will implement the command before reaching the scene. When the superior commander arrives at the scene, direct command or authorized command shall be carried out.” That is to say, for fighting fires, when fighting independently, it is usually commanded by the detachment, brigade, or squadron; One level up. For example, when more than two squadrons are cooperating in combat, the commander of the brigade of the area in charge is responsible for the command; when more squadrons cooperate in battle, the detachment commander on the field is responsible for the command, and when several detachments coordinate operations, the commander of the corps on the field is responsible for the command. .

3 . Third, solve the problem of who is commanded by the fire department. According to the provisions of Article 57 of the "Public Fire Fighting Forces on Combat Battle Order": "The chief commander of the Public Security Fire Force on-site Operational Command Headquarters is generally held by the head of the public security firefighting (branch and military) team on the same day as the chief head or the highest head on the scene. ". According to Article 10 of the "Public Fire Fighting Forces on Combat Battle Order": "The head of the corps and detachment shall be headed by the Chief of Staff of the Corps, the detachment, and the chief of the command, the head of the Political Department (department), the head of the logistics department, and the fire supervision department ( The chiefs of the teams and squadrons are alternated by the brigade and squadron officers. In summary, in the process of firefighting operations, the head of the firefighting agency on duty is the chief commander. If there is a higher-level head of the fire control agency, they will arrive at the scene. , it can be directly commanded by the general commander, or by its arrangements to authorize the relevant personnel to direct.

(b) What is the problem of solving the command?

1 . It is clear that the commander is affiliated with the command and the task is divided. In the various fire-fighting time periods and series of operations after the alarm, the commander, especially the first-tier commander of the brigade detachment, should give priority to the combat forces and the next level commander, operational assistant, non-on-duty personnel on the scene. (including the leaders of fire protection agencies at all levels), etc. The command affiliations of “who is in charge and who should be commanded” are clearly defined, and the division of tasks among each commander, each combat function group, and each security and other functional group is defined at each time slot. It is necessary to make things happen, to be responsible, and to avoid confusion, shirking, and confusion.

2 . Focus on combat objectives, tactics, and operational priorities. In any firefighting operation, it must be very clear about the target of combat in different time periods and determine the combination of the three groups of fire fighting, fire control, and rescue. After the target is determined, the combat tactics will be determined according to the operational objectives, and the presence force and reinforcement force will be laid out to form a firefighting and rescue function group, set up gun positions, and implement first-line combat command. After the objectives and tactics have been determined, the commander should pay attention to the key aspects of operations, such as security protection, water supply foam, adopting technological measures, strengthening communications security, search and rescue rotation, and intermittent exchanges. It is necessary to repeatedly schedule, confirm, and guide corrective actions for key contents. .

3 . Coordinating operations support work. While the fire fighting is underway, a series of auxiliary work related to the handling of disasters shall be simultaneously commanded. The main contents are: the general commander shall report directly to the leaders of the local government, the leaders of the public security organs, and the leaders of the fire control agencies at the next level; The station command center reported the information and communicated and coordinated with the relevant government departments, public security organs, and the command center of the next-level fire control agency; ordered the warfare and security to be dispatched, and the commander of the battle commander went to the command post to coordinate supplies, food, oil, medical, etc. Guaranteeing supply; ordering fire dispatch teams to dispatch, collecting evidence, controlling suspects, and inquiring about materials in advance; ordering public communication teams to dispatch, setting up press release points at the scene, communicating with the media in time, releasing operational and disaster related news, paying attention to and guiding the network舆 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;. For the above command content, the planning and detailed work should be done in advance. According to the size of the disaster situation and the needs of the operation, the general commander should order the division of labor to execute in a timely manner.

(c) Solve the problem of how to direct

1 . The implementation of unified command, step by step command. In accordance with the provisions of the Fire Law and the on-duty fighting regulations, a uniform command shall be formed for each firefighting operation, and the formation of a unified command and step-by-step command mode under the command of the general commander shall be advocated. The command must be quickly erected and clearly marked. The composition of personnel should be strong and effective and ensure that the duties are performed in place. The general commander must integrate the opinions of the command members, and members of the functional groups must obey the orders and obey the command and consciously assist the commander in carrying out the work. All command orders are issued in the name of the general command. Commands of each functional group must not be inconsistent with the command of the general command. Under normal circumstances, non-supervision command is not allowed. Non-commanders cannot issue command orders without authorization (but can provide command advice).

2 . Regulate the command procedure. In accordance with the time and links of firefighting operations, various feasible command procedures have been formulated in advance to form a command guide for operations. Commands are carried along with the command vehicles and commanders, and commands are conducted according to procedures to avoid rushing and losing sight of one another. For example, after receiving the alarm, the commander can order the command center to provide operational guidance to the fire-fighting unit (the guidance content has a priority level, including opening the fire radio for evacuation guidance, opening the smoke control system, opening the automatic fire extinguishing system, and preparing relevant information for the arrival The fire squadron commander provides assistance and coordination...); Before the commander arrives, the operational assistant and the command center must collect the information of the disaster situation and the layout information of the first battle to draw the operational schematic diagram. The combat team is responsible for providing the commander with suggestions on the operational objectives and tactics; If there is a need for cross-regional reinforcement and social linkage, the commander must give an order in advance to arrange the special person to be in charge of the coordination of the combat forces, to prompt the dispatch route, the assembly position, the coordination task, the matters needing attention, the command affiliation, etc.; for the public communication, the commander should arrange the command The department communicates with the public communication group and the rear commander to form a unified publication and publish it after review and communication to avoid confusion and inconsistency.

3 . Expand the use of good command mode. To expand and expand the command channel, it is recommended that besides walkie-talkies and telephones, information methods should be widely used, such as the application of the WeChat platform (WeChat command circle), video platforms, etc., and the command command is issued and the analysis and judgment of information can be rapidly transmitted; Use graphic command mode as much as possible to exert the effect of “a picture is worth a thousand words” to enable combatants and commanders at all levels to understand and execute combat orders in a short period of time; to record and share operational orders and changes in disaster conditions, so that Whenever personnel are involved in combat operations, they can clearly understand the situation on the scene and the combat situation, avoid repeated inquiries, and avoid obstacles in the communication between the front and rear; they can properly discuss the use of remote command and flat command, and the focus of remote command should be placed on non- The coordination and coordination of direct operations play a role in supporting front-line operations. To be sure, it is also possible to command the frontline specific combat operations directly through the remote command or flat command directly at the rear, but be cautious and as far as possible to seek and respect the views of the frontline commanders; use multiple methods to save and timely release the command Information and disaster scene information, and establish a system to prohibit non-commanders (including leaders at all levels) to telephone the command center and frontline commanders to avoid causing confusion to the command center and front-line commanders. The information communication team must promptly release information and report internal information. For non-commanders to understand the disaster and combat conditions. The above three points are just points, must be more detailed and in-depth, the formation of the command of the operation, and supporting the corresponding operating tools, materials and personnel to accelerate the scientific and procedural command.

Third, to ensure a strong command of the fire field

(1) Further strengthen and guarantee the construction of a fire extinguishing commander team

At present, firefighting forces at all levels generally lack the backbone talents for the study of firefighting operations. The development of firefighting and rescue cadres in the field of appointment and promotion also has some institutional and institutional constraints. Without thorough resolution, the firefighting fighting power of firefighting forces will not be too great. Promote. Anything must be done well, must rely on talented people, rely on a sufficient number, respected, have the right to speak with the talents, strengthen the construction of the fire extinguishing commander team must come up with some specific, operational and concrete measures.

(II) Further strengthen the training, assessment and reward of commanders

The training of commanders is a systematic project. A commander at any level must have a corresponding and sufficient number of trainings (including theory and practice) and be qualified for examination before they can be appointed. In particular, the leadership of the detachment level, the leadership of the detachment department, and the leader of the brigade should all participate in the training and pass the assessment. In the future, in battle evaluations and summaries, it is necessary to conduct meticulous analysis of the operational command. If there are obvious problems in commanding overstepping power, lacking command, or having obvious problems in command, the relevant responsibilities shall be investigated. If the command is effective, it shall be rewarded with meritorious service and be commended with great fanfare.

(III) Further Strengthening the Cultivation of Big Command Concept

Party committees and military and government officials at all levels must take the lead in researching fire fighting operations and command. Party committees must discuss and negotiate, and must form a mechanism and atmosphere for conducting command and discussion of the fire field. It is necessary to focus on the system and the overall situation of the command, from front-to-front operations to rear-end coordination, and all aspects of the entire process must be included in the command to firmly establish the concept of the Great Command. We must start with the details, start from a small fire, strictly follow the procedures and operational guidelines, establish a command concept, consolidate and enhance command capabilities, and gradually form a pattern of large-scale command of fire fighting operations with fire characteristics.

Author: always say